State-national ideology: methodological and practical problems

Ideología estatal nacional: problemas metodológicos y prácticos

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Received: 06/10/2017 • Approved: 25/10/2017

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ABSTRACT:
The article is devoted to clarifying the definition of "state-national ideology", as well as to some issues of its problems existing at the present stage. The authors examine state ideology through the prism of such categories as: "public needs", "national interests", and "class interests". Based on the methodological combination of the Marxist and the conservative approaches to the state issues, the authors of the present article consider state-national ideology as the officially expressed set of ideas, where the basic social needs are reflected in a concentrated form, understood through the national interests. As part of state ideology, the interweaving of national and class components necessarily takes place; it is characterized by wholeness, heterogeneity and flexibility in view of the dynamics of external and internal situation, along with the changing power relations among the ruling elite. The authors are inclined to consider the discrepancy between theory and practice, i.e. state ideology and state policy as one of the major problems of state-national ideology in the modern world. This is caused not so much by the functional weakening of the modern world national states, but rather by the global spread of the neoliberal project, which stimulates class interest and, accordingly, weakens the national aspects of official state ideology and state policy.

RESUMEN:
El artículo está dedicado a aclarar la definición de "ideología estatal nacional", así como a algunos problemas existentes en la etapa actual. Los autores examinan la ideología del estado a través del prisma de categorías tales como: "necesidades públicas", "intereses nacionales" e "intereses de clase". Con base en la combinación metodológica de los enfoques marxista y conservador a las cuestiones estatales, los autores del presente artículo consideran la ideología estatal nacional como el conjunto de ideas oficialmente expresadas, donde las necesidades sociales básicas se reflejan en una forma concentrada, entendida a través de los intereses nacionales. Como parte de la ideología estatal, necesariamente se produce el entrelazamiento de los componentes nacionales y de clase; se caracteriza por la integridad, la heterogeneidad y la flexibilidad en vista de la dinámica de la situación externa e interna, junto con las cambiantes relaciones de poder entre la elite gobernante. Los autores se inclinan a considerar la discrepancia entre la teoría y la práctica, es decir, la ideología estatal y la política estatal como uno de los principales problemas de la ideología estatal nacional en el mundo moderno. Esto se debe no tanto al debilitamiento funcional de los estados nacionales del mundo moderno, sino a la expansión global del proyecto neoliberal, que estimula el interés...
1. Introduction

Modern social reality is often described in terms of post-modernism, stating the differentiation and fragmentation of the social world. A well-known postmodern thinker, J. Lyotard claims that the era of meta-narratives – integral worldview systems – is now behind us (Lyotard, 1998). It is replaced by a number of particularistic narratives, which, although can completely deny each other, but none of them is dominant, which implies a free choice of these narratives. In shifting to traditional scientific concepts and specifying somewhat speculative postmodern thesis of the author, we will focus on the issues of political and ideological space really losing its integrity in its current state, suffering from fragmentation and eclectization processes.

The so-called "total ideologies", which not so long ago have been adopted by the entire governmental entities, now lose their connection with social existence; their place is actively occupied by partial or "molecular" ideologies (the terms proposed by J. Shvartsmantel). And if the first ones tried to cover the entire spectrum of social reality, thus forming an integral worldview, the latter are characterized by fragmentation, affecting only part of the social world, namely, the range of issues which are matters of interest to such ideology. These ideologies include environmentalism, feminism, as well as several types of corporate ideologies.

The undoubted crisis of total ideologies, among them being the well-known triad – conservatism, liberalism, socialism – generates differences in the assessments. The prerequisites for this crisis established themselves, apparently, several decades ago, when a number of well-known researchers (D. Bell, S. Lipset, R. Aron) risked to proclaim the "end of ideologies". And now there are sociologists sympathetic to this position, as a rule, being skeptical about ideologies (U. Matz). Nevertheless, total ideologies, which seem to be left behind, have many supporters advocating for their resuscitation and modernization (J. Shvartsmantel, M. Afanasev).

In the context of this state of affairs, attention is drawn to the issues of state-national ideology. On the one hand, the relevance of its consideration is dictated by the changing role of state in a globalizing world, which inevitably affects the official ideological component. On the other hand, state ideology cannot but react to the strengthening of ideological pluralism. On the third side, in post-Soviet Russia it is fitting to question the ideological processes at the official level; since for a little over a quarter of a century it has been impossible to develop a nationwide unifying concept shared by the social majority.

The purpose of this article is to develop the concept of state ideology more or less adequate to contemporary realities and to identify the problem factors of its formation. In accordance with the above-mentioned purpose, the article will address the following objectives.

1) Analysis of the phenomenon of state ideology perspective from different methodological approaches.

2) Identification of objective and subjective sources of state ideology through the category of "public needs", "national interests" and "class interests".

3) Revealing the practical problems of state ideology in a context of intensification of globalization processes.

2. Methods and sources of research

The present article is prepared on the basis of the theoretical analysis of scientific articles and...
monographs. The authors relied primarily on the Marxist approach, which considered the class interest of the ruling groups as the basis of state ideology; on G. Musikhin’s liberal vision of state ideology as a "constitutional ideology"; on interpretation of national-state ideology in line with conservatism (I. Isaev); and, finally, on M. Afanasev’s interpretation of state ideology, who analyzed it in relation to the right idea. Classification of ideologies into total and partial is based on theoretical developments of Karl Mannheim – the classic of social and philosophical thought – and the works of contemporary British political scientist J. Shvartsmantel.

The authors’ vision of globalization, in the context of which the dynamics of state ideology is examined, is mainly influenced by the school of world-system analysis (I. Wallerstein, G. Arrighi). The substance of such basic categories as "public needs", "national interests", "state interests" and "class interests" was determined based on the works of the Russian-Canadian researcher O. Arin (A. Battler), as well as on the Marxist interpretation.

The article also includes some results of the content analysis of official documents of the Russian Government (Presidential Messages), articles and speeches of the government officials – V. Surkov's article "Nationalization of the Future" (2006), D. Medvedev's article "Russia, Forward!" (2009) and Vladimir Putin's speech at the Valdai Forum 2013 "The Diversity of Russia for the Modern World".

3. Discussion and results

3.1. Theory of state-national ideology (review of approaches)

It is undeniable that the problem of the formation of state ideology is an integral part of political genesis. The Russian researcher L. Grinin, the author of several detailed works on the birth and development of state institutions, notes an extremely important role of ideological support already at the stage of early state entities. "State" ideas were designed to explain and justify the existence of a governing organization of socio-political inequality and also to create awareness of some kind of community within the state-territorial framework (Grinin, 2007, pp. 33-34). Subsequently, with the development of state institutions and the complication of social relations, the structure and role of ideology varied, as the supreme power was desacralized, and accordingly the religious component was reduced, the main bet was placed on the rational facts. At the same time, such a process did not reach its logical conclusion (and it could not reach it), and in some cases national and state ideologies "have become a kind of new secular religions" (Grinin, 2007, p. 288).

It is quite obvious that the growing state, being an active social subject, needed an ideological and theoretical justification for its own actions. But what is the essence of the formation of a state ideology? In this regard, the old, but still meaningful Marxist view deserves attention. According to the founders of scientific communism, ideology is created in the bowels of the ruling class, which in turn undertakes a particular "division of labor" – with one part of the ruling class developing ideas of the ruling class itself (Marx, 2000, p. 368). Although state ideology should contain a concentrated form of "public interest", the problem is that in a class society, the coverage of interests of all social groups is simply impossible, just because each class acts from the perspective of its aspirations, opposing the intentions of other social groups. Therefore, once the ruling class seizes a leading position in society, it is trying to adopt the present situation, and on a theoretical level – to become the dominant spiritual power, pretending its own class interest being the public one.

Such a perspective, although it contains a very powerful heuristic potential, is not applicable to all cases. Its inflexibility was partially recognized by the classics of Marxism themselves, while adjusted to certain reservations (Engels, 1985, p. 364). In this article, the problem of combining class and national (supra-class) interests in state ideology will be one of the primary ones. And in this regard, it makes sense to at least briefly draw attention to the interpretation of state ideology in contemporary social science. It should immediately be noted that the
ideological and political imprint in the authors' methodology is usually quite noticeable.

The well-known researcher of political ideology G. Musikhin raises the question of "ideology of power", examining it generally from the liberal point of view. In his opinion, the tremendous, mainly socio-cultural transformations of the "new era" have stimulated the ruling groups for additional efforts aimed at "preserving the ideological initiative in the value justification of power in the eyes of all the major groups of society" (Musikhin, 2010, p. 28). The ideological platform containing the structural definition of the state's relations with its nationals (citizens), as well as constituting the nation's idea of itself and at the same time acting as an instrument for its formation, is defined by G. Musikhin as a "constitutional ideology" (Musikhin, 2010, p. 29).

The spread of "constitutional ideology" in society is becoming one of the primary objectives of the elite groups. Otherwise, the exercise of power functions "turns out to be, if not impossible, then, in any case, extremely difficult, because any action of the authorities can come across misunderstanding and rejection by the society". At the same time, "constitutional ideology" is much broader than a purely legal framework, capturing all aspects of regulation and organization of public life and concerning not only the value sphere, but also specific mechanisms for implementing political decisions. "The ideological influence of state on its citizens is exercised through various spheres of their daily life – from school education that broadcasts typical examples of mass culture to certain political practices (starting with the military recruitment as an introduction to the state security system and ending with the right to vote as a means of inclusion in the mechanism of public decision-making)" (Musikhin, 2010, p. 28).

G. Musikhin quite rightfully notes the "open scenario" of the state ideological policy (Musikhin, 2010), while at the same time, in his discussion he pays little attention to the problem of correlation between the class and the supra-class (national) orientation.

Political scientist and legal expert I.A. Isaev considers it necessary to separate the phenomena of national idea and national ideology. If the former is the engine of the nation, then the second is the guidance system on the path of its movement. As inherent in conservatives, the author believes that the basis of the national unity is not in the rationally developed programs and slogans, but in those deeply-rooted archetypes and emotions. The national idea is necessarily conservative and is "always present in the minds and institutions of the people and the nation", being their integral part. At all historical stages, the national idea is generally the same – retaining its basic sources, principles and trends, although it has many modifications. National ideology is presented as an external form of the national idea, ensuring its formulation and postulation. In contrast to the national idea, it is more volatile, each time taking new forms and adapting to the dynamics of the living conditions and historical circumstances at various stages of the national history (Isaev, 2006). Once formulated, the ideology turns into a real fact, prompting all those who fall into the sphere of its influence to act and think in accordance with its main definitions. "The masses fall under the influence and power of ideology precisely because they are unable to formulate their own independent idea about the world and history".

At the same time, ideology cannot fully and adequately express the national idea, which is elusive and "dissolved in everyday life". National ideology is incomplete and necessarily contains an element of "false consciousness", at least because it presents national values and priorities in a way that is beneficial only to a certain society group, namely the elite, which itself forms the basic ideological postulates. As a matter of principle, ideology cannot reflect the views and aspirations of the national community as a whole, being the result of social compromise. At the same time, I. Isaev emphasizes that the main subject of ideological production is the nation-state. It is the latter that formulates the role of national ideology, protecting it from corrosive critique of "indirect forces" and implementing it in its specific programs and practices (Isaev, 2006).

I. Isaev's reasoning should be clearly attributed to the conservative position. Unlike K. Marx, he is inclined to affirm mainly the nationally oriented character of state activity, including in
ideological politics, whereas K. Marx believes that state ideology is inherent in the class meaning disguised as a public one. Isaev rather tends to the view that national and group (class) elements are intertwined in national ideology and not disguised as the other ones.

Another Russian researcher M. Afanasev analyses ideological problems from the perspective of a certain middle-point approach. In his opinion, the right-wing idea of political and philosophical spectrum has always served as the basis of state policy, since "it is identified with social domination and the ruling elite" (Afanasev, 2011, pp. 29-30). In the course of historical process, the essence of the right idea changed simultaneously with changes in the ruling groups. Thus, at first this role was fulfilled by absolutism, then after the transition of power levers from aristocracy to the representatives of upper middle class, it was liberalism that declared itself as the right idea.

At the same time, class character of the liberal worldview clearly hindered the exercise of state functions in practice. After all, even the most class-oriented state cannot completely ignore the needs of the entire society. Therefore, the official state policy was a "matter of practical synthesis," rather than doctrinairism (Afanasev, 2011, p. 38). According to M. Afanasev, the ideas of enlightened conservatism played an important role here; their philosophical substantiation took place in the works of G. Hegel, and further developed by E. Burke, as well as in the works and documents of the "founding fathers" of the United States. It is the enlightened conservatism, having imposed a certain framework on liberalism, that helped to impart a more supra-class, i.e. more nationally oriented, idea to the state policy of O. Bismarck, B. Disraeli, Napoleon III.

M. Afanasev recognizes the right idea (acting, in his opinion, as a justification of state policy) to show natural flexibility given to the need to adjust to the changing environment. But he is clearly inclined to believe that philosophical basis of state ideology should be a combination of liberal and enlightened conservative principles (Afanasev, 2011, p. 41).

Vulnerable parts of M. Afanasyev's rather curious approach should be considered as certain absoluteness, not so much of the right idea as such, but rather of the philosophy of enlightened conservatism open to several liberal elements. It seems that the ideological predisposition of the thinker himself, who can be considered as moderate liberal, has been at play. However, it should be noted that state policy can be based on a purely left-wing idea – a good example would be the former Soviet society. Another issue that provokes our doubts is that M. Afanasev connects the supra-class character of politics of the well-known European statesmen of the 19th century with the ideas of enlightened conservatism, willingly or unwillingly belittling the role of their personal qualities (including those of O. Bismarck).

All the above points are focusing on the presence of state ideology as such. At the same time, most researchers see the problem of the class-national correlation. Now it is time to express our own thoughts on the subject.

3.2. Objective and subjective sources of state ideology

The works of the Russian-Canadian researcher O. Arin (A. Battler) clarify the notions of "state interests", "national interests", "public needs", through the analysis and correlation of which it is possible to reach the informative problematic of state ideology. As O. Arin writes: "the interest of state is a subjective form of expressing the objective needs of society, which, in accumulated form, are expressed through the interests of state, i.e. they are in fact state interests" (highlighted by O. Arin – Y.T., M.G.). It goes without saying that interests of specific states can differ due to a number of factors, but such interests as territorial integrity, political sovereignty or independence, maintenance of the dominant system, that is, political and economic regime; economic development and prosperity, as well as the national and cultural identity – remain fundamental (Arin, 2002, pp. 381-382).

There is no doubt that state policy, under which the practical implementation of state interests is proceeding, should somehow be built in accordance with the above-mentioned fundamental interests. It should be noted that in the process of the political system's transformation, there is a need to consider the interests of the society as a whole, ensuring compatibility and sustainability.
needs of society. If we define a nation in the spirit of a constructivist approach (in this case it is convenient), then the latter can be defined with the term "national interests". The official state ideology should include these basic national interests as state interests. It follows that state ideology is always total – that is, it covers the maximum possible range of social needs and problems. At the same time, state ideology cannot but bear the imprint of the worldview of the political class, since ideology is formed either by them, or with their direct participation and control.

Nevertheless, the relationship of class interests, reflecting the needs of individual social groups, as well as national interests, in which the objective needs of the entire society are expressed, can take various and rather complex forms. They can be virtually the opposite, while coinciding on the whole, therefore in the first case class and social interests can easily be discerned, but in the second case it can be much more difficult. Anyway, their particular combination takes place within the framework of state interests, theoretically designated in the official ideology.

In our opinion, the detailed definition of ideology of the Belarusian scientist V. Melnik refers to the presence of this combination of group (class) and social elements. From his point of view, ideology "is a relatively systematized set of ideas, values and beliefs arising from position, interests and aspirations of certain groups and communities of people; acting in its form or essence as an expression of interests and aspirations of the entire society and serving as an instrument of collective social action. The ideology in any form always acts as a system of ideas and beliefs in which certain groups of people understand the existing reality and their position in it, express their needs and interests, formulate their goals and aspirations and substantiate the ways and means of achieving them" (highlighted by us – Y.T., M.G.) (Melnik, 2005, p. 15).

Before we venture to formulate our own interpretation of state ideology, we consider it necessary to note the following circumstance. State interest does not necessarily fully reflect the objective needs of society, the subjective expression of which we decided to define through the notion of "national interest". The fact is that in the modern world there is a growing tendency of distancing the state apparatus from the rest of society, which actualizes the explanatory possibilities of the class approach adopted by the Marxist advocates. The latter rightly noted the desire of the ruling groups to impart their own class interests for the national ones. In this regard, it is quite natural for the developers of state doctrine to include provisions reflecting the national interests as much as possible to strengthen the legitimacy of the political regime, but in practice they do not always follow them, and there are numerous examples of this fact. So we believe that the official policy expresses state interest, which, in our understanding, is not quite rightly identified with the national interest.

Thus, state ideology does not necessarily coincide with official policy, which in the modern world can be pretty often felt. This combination of class and national interests can be disguised in ideological theoretical forms, but usually manifests itself in form of practical steps. Hence, the official ideology can, in our opinion, be designated as a state-national ideology, while the official policy can only have state, but not always national character.

So, we believe that state ideology is a formal expression of a set of ideas, which in concentrated form reflects the basic social needs that are understood through the national interests. State ideology has a number of qualitative features, of which the following are particularly noteworthy.

First of all, state ideology can only be total, because it is carried out at an appropriate scale – seeking to capture (even if only in a theoretical perspective) the entire range of basic social problems.

Secondly, state ideology cannot have a uniform orientation. That is, it cannot be exclusively class oriented, as the Marxist advocates tend to assert, neither can it express the national interests exclusively, as generally observed in case of the conservative approach. It is more likely that state ideology is an interlacing of national (social) and class interests. Even more clearly this phenomenon is expressed in practice – in the sphere of public politics, where the
The ratio of "class" and "national" can be otherwise than in the structure of state doctrine and, as a rule, with the first prevailing. As already stated, the official ideology focuses on the national (social) problems, masking it under the needs of specific group. But in practice, the actions of the governing structures can differ (and often principally) from their own declarative provisions (for example, for a long time statements about the weakening of the administrative press towards small and medium-sized business in Russia have been refuted by the real state of affairs).

Finally, thirdly, this is an "open scenario" of state ideological policy. Constantly changing external and internal situation in the context of social processes and social time acceleration makes the adjustments to the state doctrine inevitable, even to the most odious one. The ignorance of this problem will do no good to the state or society. Thus, the Soviet state ideology of the Lenin-Stalin-Khrushchev period is characterized by the ability to modify construction in a given country – from the idea of a world revolution to the idea of socialism, and later to the idea of peaceful coexistence of capitalist and socialist systems. The dogmatism of the USSR state doctrine was revealed in the Brezhnev era with all the devastating consequences for the Soviet regime. Thus, it is difficult for state-national ideology to stay within the framework of one single ideological project, not diluting it with opposing ideological principles, sometimes successfully disguising them (for example, the famous "Stakhanov movement" concealed a partial restoration of simple material incentives behind the socialist slogans). Even in the "century of ideologies" (20th century) seemingly irreconcilable doctrines showed some tendencies towards rapprochement (Tambiyants, 2006).

At the same time, it cannot be said that the state apparatus is the only source of ideology, attracting scientists and thinkers close to the ruling elites. Society itself should be considered an important source of ideology, since it can understand problems of national interests even more acutely than the official politicians. Modern Russian political scientist V. Pastukhov believes that in the Western countries, society itself created ideology, guided by the problem of vital reality, and imposed this ideology on the state; whereas in Russia the things were done in the opposite way: the state used to borrow this or another doctrine from other countries (usually from the Western ones) and spread it in the society, ignoring its fundamentally different social conditions (Pastukhov, 2001).

We believe that V. Pastukhov's arguments are excessively categorical. Even the Marxism has taken root not in our country in its own way, rather than in the Western version personified by G. Plekhanov and the Mensheviks. The Lenin's (Bolshevik's) Marxism was thoroughly redefined on the basis of the Russian social specifics, which made it more or less workable project.

In our opinion, the discussion should focus on two ideological processes, which usually occur simultaneously publicly and socially. Forms of their relationship can vary widely – from sharply confrontational to fully cooperative, and in this regard the allegations of contradictions in the western and Russian experiences seems a little hasty to us. The configuration of political-ideological forces within the ruling elite, which forms the state policy, plays an important role here, if not the leading one. Thus, liberalism has penetrated into the official doctrine of the British Empire, mainly through the representatives of the upper middle class, which the hereditary aristocrats were forced to admit to elite circles. Responsive attitude towards public expectations is inherent in the authorities, that are not interested in large-scale social upheavals and are really scared of them. For example, in the reign of Alexander II, the reaction to the liberal sentiment of society was the appointment of liberal politicians (Milyutin, Loris-Melikov) to important ministerial posts and introduction of the relevant changes. In the reign of the next Emperor Alexander III, official politics and ideology became more conservative-reactionary, which was expressed by the dominance of the advocates of conservative ideas among of the ruling elite (K. Pobedonostsev). Consequently, during this period, state and public ideology were in a state of mutual hostility. In fact, the same, if not more severe situation had been characteristic of Spain from the 16th to the middle of the 19th century, where the Inquisition, expressing the official state ideology, was raging, suppressing significant outbreaks.
3.3. State ideology problems in the context of globalization

What is the problem of state-national ideology at the present stage? It is quite logical to assume that this issue is connected with the thesis on reducing the role of national states in the era of globalization. Moreover, globalism has led many scholars to raise the question of society’s existence (Goffman, 2005), which hitherto was identified with the national social system politically manifested through the national state.

Quite a popular thesis about the reduction of the state's role certainly has a solid argument. It basically boils down not only to pointing out the tendency of erosion of national borders in an open economy, but also to the emergence of new actors, often of equal importance and sometimes even superior to discrete national governments. However, many well-known scientists still tend to consider national state as the main subject of internal, and in many respects external political process.

Thus, the above-mentioned Russian-Canadian researcher O. Arin cites convincing arguments that in the course of globalization some national governments really lose influence, while the role of others, on the contrary, significantly increases. In the first case, we are talking about the outsiders of globalization (third and partially second world countries), whereas in the second case – about the leaders of globalization, the Western countries and more broadly, representatives of the "first world" (Arin, 2002).

Large transnational corporations (TNCs) have significantly expanded their field of activity beyond the economic framework, however, modern TNCs do not possess full political independence. It is possible that the reason for this lies in the principle of "revolving door" (D. Rothkopf), connecting the government of corporations and government structures of the leading countries. Operating in such a "bundle" TNCs generally achieve their goals. This suggests that large corporations do not so much compete as political actors with the national governments, but enhance their activities, often acting jointly as one. This perspective is supported by the well-known modern sociologists and representatives of the world-system analysis I. Wallerstein (2004) and G. Arrighi (2008). However, one should not forget about many countries, both weakly and moderately developed, where corporations act not only as political, but also ideological subjects, limiting the role of the national government and disintegrating the spiritual sphere.

The British researcher John Shvartsmantel seeks to express the problems faced by traditional total ideologies, namely the triad – conservatism, liberalism, socialism – in an integrated way. In his opinion, in this respect it is worth talking about fragmentation, heterogeneity, the absence of a single goal (Shvartsmantel, 2009). The reasoning of this scientist is actually built around issues of identity, which at the moment has become less significant than before. If the traditional ideologies sought to create awareness of belonging to a world that often went beyond the state and national boundaries (the socialist world, the liberal world), then the new ideologies having filled the spiritual space affect much more specific partial identity. Because of this, the new ideological systems that have replaced the total world view are designated by J. Shvartsmantel as "molecular" or "fragmentary" ideologies (similar to the reasoning given at the beginning of F.J. Lyotard's article).

Indeed, if we recall not so distant past, the era of modernity was characterized by a certain homogeneity and ideological integrity. This created conditions for the governmental approval at the national level of a particular system of ideas from the above-mentioned ideological triad – conservatism, liberalism, socialism. The fierce competition between these three total ideologies usually led to approval at the national level of either a liberal, or a conservative, or a socialist project, of course, not devoid of specific cultural and national characteristics in each specific case. But, thus, the nucleus of the national-state ideology was belonging to one of the three ideological systems (ideological identity), while cultural and civilizational features acted as if on
secondary roles, although, they certainly could not disappear completely and, as demonstrated by the development of situation, they only waited for their chance.

Today the existence of integral political thinking is extremely difficult not only at the international level but also at the domestic national level. The open scenario of official ideological policy has been changing for the better part of the twentieth century with the preservation of the core ideas of liberalism, socialism or conservatism. Today this nucleus can often turn out to be either thoroughly blurred, (as, for example, in European countries where the masses of labor migrants coming mainly from the Muslim countries of the East seriously compete with the liberal statehood) or completely lost, as it happened to socialism in Russia.

At the same time, national governments quite naturally require certain guidelines, according to which policy and national ideology should be designed. And in this situation, as expected, the ideology of national identity is replaced by civilizational identity, which makes us remember the S. Huntington's approach. In any case, over the last decade in the production of the modern Russian ideological products cultural and civilizational argumentation has significantly expanded – in this regard, it is enough to compare V. Surkov's article "Nationalization of the Future" (2006), D. Medvedev's article "Russia, forward!" (2009) and V. Putin's Valdai speech "The Diversity of Russia for the Modern World" (2013). At the same time, although the West is trying to engage in a dialogue with Russia from the perspective of rather cliché liberal values – "human rights", "economic freedoms", "inviolability of territorial integrity", etc., all this is looking more and more like disguise, concealing the old civilizational issues, based on both cultural differences and geopolitical interests.

We believe that the neoliberal project (which in the ideological aspect looks much weaker than in political and practical aspects) should be considered as a real issue and perhaps the main problem for state-national ideology. According to its ideological and applied essence, neoliberalism has a distinctly class character, which it doesn't really try to disguise. Basically, it is precisely with this circumstance that we are inclined to explain its "triumphal procession" lasting for almost four decades (from the beginning of the 1970s). On the one hand, the neoliberal project acts as self-sufficient objective reality, often playing the role of a constraint of national sovereignty at the international level. On the other hand, the implementation of the neoliberal principles leads to the consolidation of class dominance of the current leading groups, which in this connection turn out to be very interested in them. At the same time, neoliberal policies can hardly be popular among the social majority and this fact forces governments to "brainwash" the population more actively through populist rhetoric that has little to do with reality. But, it is quite natural that such efforts can only produce an incomplete and temporary result. The antagonism between the government agencies and the rest of society will continue to grow, whilst functional efficiency of the official ideology will decline, thereby fundamentally undermining the pillars of state-national identity.

At the same time, the state of national ideology does not look hopeless at all. There is a significant reserve potential in national systems, which can be used by the developers of the official doctrine to strengthen the integration and mobilization effect (Grin, 2015). Thus, J. Shvartsmantel insightfully points out that national state is characterized with a shared history and emotional basis, which is lacking in other ideological subjects, often resorting to abstract ideals, little associated with social specifics (2009). It seems to us that such an emotional basis easily comes to the fore in cases of escalation of external situation. Under such conditions, a sort of reanimation of the state's national identity is taking place, and the official ideology can regain strength, even if it's temporary. This is evidenced at least by the Soviet experience, when the integration and mobilization effect of ideology was manifested when the Soviet people were opposed to the "hostile capitalist surroundings" much greater than when they attempted to develop the same labor enthusiasm. The substantially similar situation was on the Russian foreign policy arena of the past years, when the Russian public opinion mainly draw attention to the decisiveness of the president V. Putin engaged in confrontation with the Western world over Ukraine, rather than to the obvious blunders in socio-economic policy.
4. Conclusion
So, in our understanding, state-national ideology is an officially expressed set of ideas, where the basic social needs are understood through the national interests. It is characterized with totality, heterogeneity, flexibility and necessary interlacing of the national and class component, considering the dynamics of external and internal situation, as well as a changing power balance among the ruling elite. The two main producers of state-national ideology are state and society, and the degree of their influence largely predetermines the combination ratio of class and national interests in the substantive part of the official doctrine.

One of the main problems of state ideology in the modern world should be considered the divergence between theory and practice (that is, state ideology and state policy), which is primarily caused by the global spread of the neoliberal project. The latter acts as a powerful stimulus for strengthening the class component attracting the elites, but unpopular with the social majority. As a result, neoliberal policy usually hides behind nationally-oriented slogans seeking to divert public attention to other problems. This often gives a short-term effect, but in the long run it leads to the increase in internal antagonisms and the weakening of national integrity.

At the same time, the ratio of national and class issues is not the only problem faced by the state ideology producers. At the present stage, in view of intensification of the migration processes accompanying globalization, the problem of interethnic relations is being actualized. A number of signs suggest that the multiculturalism policy is likely to collapse, accompanied by the growth of ethnonational manifestations. This raises the question of possible forms of interrelations between class and ethnic consciousness, which the producers of state ideology can hardly ignore. Moreover, the impact of a number of significant partial ideologies on the total state ideology (for example, corporatism) remains very poorly investigated, which forms a field of prospective studies in the future.

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Revista ESPACIOS. ISSN 0798 1015
Vol. 38 (Nº 62) Year 2017

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